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Abstract. We devise a variant of Dialectica interpretation of intuition-
istic linear logic for LMSO, a linear logic-based version MSO over infinite
words. LMSO was known to be correct and complete w.r.t. Church’s syn-
thesis, thanks to an automata-based realizability model. Invoking Büchi-
Landweber Theorem and building on a complete axiomatization of MSO
on infinite words, our interpretation provides us with a syntactic app-
roach, without any further construction of automata on infinite words.
Via Dialectica, as linear negation directly corresponds to switching play-
ers in games, we furthermore obtain a complete logic: either a closed
formula or its linear negation is provable. This completely axiomatizes
the theory of the realizability model of LMSO. Besides, this shows that
in principle, one can solve Church’s synthesis for a given ∀∃-formula by
only looking for proofs of either that formula or its linear negation.
Keywords: Linear logic · Dialectica interpretation ·
MSO on Infinite Words
1 Introduction
Monadic Second-Order Logic (MSO) over ω-words is a simple yet expressive
language for reasoning on non-terminating systems which subsumes non-trivial
logics used in verification such as LTL (see e.g. [2,30]). MSO on ω-words is decid-
able by Büchi’s Theorem [6] (see e.g. [24,29]), and can be completely axiomatized
as a subsystem of second-order Peano’s arithmetic [28]. While MSO admits an
effective translation to finite-state (Büchi) automata, it is a non-constructive
logic, in the sense that it has true (i.e.provable) ∀∃-statements which can be
witnessed by no continuous stream function.
On the other hand, Church’s synthesis [8] can be seen as a decision problem
for a strong form of constructivity in MSO. More precisely (see e.g. [12,32]),
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M. Bojańczyk and A. Simpson (Eds.): FOSSACS 2019, LNCS 11425, pp. 470–487, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17127-8_27
A Dialectica-Like Interpretation of a Linear MSO on Infinite Words 471
Church’s synthesis takes as input a ∀∃-formula of MSO and asks whether it
can be realized by a finite-state causal stream transducer. Church’s synthesis
is known to be decidable since Büchi-Landweber Theorem [7], which gives an
effective solution to ω-regular games on finite graphs generated by ∀∃-formulae.
In traditional (theoretical) solutions to Church’s synthesis, the game graphs are
induced from deterministic (say parity) automata obtained by McNaughton’s
Theorem [19]. Despite its long history, Church’s synthesis has not yet been
amenable to tractable solutions for the full language of MSO (see e.g. [12]).
In recent works [25,26], the authors suggested a Curry-Howard approach to
Church’s synthesis based on intuitionistic and linear variants of MSO. In partic-
ular, [26] proposed a system LMSO based on (intuitionistic) linear logic [13], in
which via a translation (−)L : MSO → LMSO, the provable ∀∃(−)L-statements
exactly correspond to the realizable instances of Church’s synthesis. Realizer
extraction for LMSO is done via an external realizability model based on alter-
nating automata, which amounts to see every formula ϕ(a) as a formula of the
form (∃u)(∀x)ϕD(u, x, a), where ϕD represents a deterministic automaton.
In this paper, we use a variant of Gödel’s “Dialectica” functional interpreta-
tion as a syntactic formulation of the automata-based realizability model of [26].
Dialectica associates to ϕ(a) a formula ϕD(a) of the form (∃u)(∀x)ϕD(u, x, a).
In usual versions formulated in higher-types arithmetic (see e.g. [1,16]), the for-
mula ϕD is quantifier-free, so that ϕD is a prenex form of ϕ. This prenex form
is constructive, and a constructive proof of ϕ can be turned to a proof of ϕD
with an explicit witness for ∃u. Even if Dialectica originally interprets intuition-
istic arithmetic, it is structurally linear, and linear versions of Dialectica were
formulated at the very beginning of linear logic [21–23] (see also [14,27]).
We show that the automata-based realizability model of [26] can be obtained
by a suitable modification of the usual linear Dialectica interpretation, in which
the formula ϕD essentially represents a deterministic automaton on ω-words
and is in general not quantifier-free, and whose realizers are exactly the finite-
state accepting strategies in the model of [26]. In addition to provide a syntactic
extraction procedure with internalized and automata-free correctness proof, this
reformulation has a striking consequence, namely that there exists an extension
LMSO(C) of LMSO which is complete in the sense that for each closed formula
ϕ, it either proves ϕ or its linear negation ϕ  ⊥. Since LMSO(C) has realizers
for all provable ∀∃(−)L-statements, its completeness contrasts with the classical
setting, in which due to provable non-constructive statements, one can not decide
Church’s synthesis by only looking for proofs of ∀∃-statements or their negations.
Besides, LMSO(C) has a linear choice axiom which is realizable in the sense of
both (−)D and [26], but whose naive MSO counterpart is false.
The paper is organized as follows. We present our basic setting in Sect. 2,
with a particular emphasis on particularities of (finite-state) causal functions to
model strategies and realizers. Our variant of Dialectica and the corresponding
linear system are discussed in Sect. 3, while Sect. 4 defines the systems LMSO
and LMSO(C) and shows the completeness of LMSO(C).
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2 Preliminaries
Alphabets (denoted Σ,Γ, etc) are finite non-empty sets of the form 2p for some
p ∈ N. We let 1 := 20. Note that alphabets are closed under Cartesian products
and set-theoretic function spaces. It follows that taking o := 2, we have an
alphabet τ for each simple type τ ∈ ST, where
σ, τ ∈ ST ::= 1 | o | σ × τ | σ → τ
We often write (τ)σ for the type σ → τ . Given an ω-word (or stream) B ∈ Σω
and n ∈ N, we write Bn for the finite word B(0). · · · .B(n − 1) ∈ Σ∗.
Church’s Synthesis and Causal Functions. Church’s synthesis consists in
the automatic extraction of stream functions from input-output specifications
(see e.g. [12,31]). These specifications are in general asked to be ω-regular, or
equivalently definable in MSO over ω-words. In practice, proper subsets of MSO
(and even of LTL) are assumed (see e.g. [5,11,12]). As an example, the relation
(∃∞k)B(k) ⇒ (∃∞k)C(k) resp. (∀∞k)B(k) ⇒ (∃∞k)C(k) (1)
with input B ∈ 2ω and output C ∈ 2ω specifies functions F : 2ω → 2ω such
that F (B) ∈ 2ω  P(N) is infinite whenever B ∈ 2ω  P(N) is infinite (resp.
the complement of B is finite). One may also additionally require to respect the
transitions of some automaton. For instance, following [31], in addition to either
case of (1) one can ask C ⊆ B and C not to contain two consecutive positions:
(∀n)(C(n) ⇒ B(n)) and (∀n)(C(n) ⇒ ¬C(n + 1)) (2)
In any case, the realizers must be (finite-state) causal functions. A stream
function F : Σω → Γω is causal (notation F : Σ →S Γ ) if it can produce a prefix
of length n of its output from a prefix of length n of its input. Hence F is causal
if it is induced by a map f : Σ+ → Γ as follows:
F (B)(n) = f(B(0) · . . . · B(n)) (for all B ∈ Σω and all n ∈ N)
The finite-state (f.s.) causal functions are those induced by Mealy machines. A
Mealy machine M : Σ → Γ is a DFA over input alphabet Σ equipped with an
output function λ : QM × Σ → Γ (where QM is the state set of M). Writing
∂∗ : Σ∗ → QM for the iteration of the transition function ∂ of M from its initial
state, M induces a causal function via (a.a ∈ Σ+) 
→ (λ(∂∗(a), a) ∈ Γ ).
Causal and f.s. causal functions form categories with finite products. Let S
be the category whose objects are alphabets and whose maps from Σ to Γ are
causal functions F : Σω → Γω. Let M be the wide subcategory of S whose maps
are finite-state causal functions.1
1 A subcategory D of C is wide if D has the same objects as C.












Fig. 1. A Mealy machine (left) and an equivalent eager (Moore) machine (right).
Example 1. (a) Usual functions Σ → Γ lift to (pointwise, one-state) maps
Σ →M Γ . For instance, the identity Σ →M Σ is induced by the Mealy machine
with 〈∂, λ〉 : (−, a) 
→ (−, a).
(b) Causal functions 1 →S Σ correspond exactly to ω-words B ∈ Σω.
(c) The conjunction of (2) with either side of (1) is realized by the causal
function F : 2 →M 2 induced by the machine M : 2 → 2 displayed on
Fig. 1 (left, where a transition a|b outputs b from input a), taken from [31].
Proposition 1. The Cartesian product of Σ1, . . . , Σn (for n ≥ 0) in S,M is
given by the product of sets Σ1 × · · · × Σn (so that 1 is terminal).
The Logic MSO(M). Our specification language MSO(M) is an extension of
MSO on ω-words with one function symbol for each f.s. causal function. More
precisely, MSO(M) is a many-sorted first-order logic, with one sort for each
simple type τ ∈ ST, and with one function symbol of arity (σ1, . . . , σn; τ) for each
map σ1×· · ·×σn →M τ. A term t of sort τ (notation tτ ) with free variables
among xσ11 , . . . , x
σn
n (we say that t is of arity (σ1, . . . , σn; τ)) thus induces a map
t : σ1 × · · · × σn →M τ. Given a valuation xi 
→ Bi ∈ σiω  S[1, σi]
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we then obtain an ω-word
t ◦ 〈B1, . . . , Bn〉 ∈ S[1, τ]  τω
MSO(M) extends MSO with ∃xτ and ∀xτ ranging over S[1, τ]  τω and
with sorted equalities tτ .= uτ interpreted as equality over S[1, τ]  τω.
Write |= ϕ when ϕ holds in this model, called the standard model. The full
definition of MSO(M) is deferred to Sect. 4.1.
An instance of Church’s synthesis problem is given by a closed formula
(∀xσ)(∃uτ )ϕ(u, x). A positive solution (or realizer) of this instance is a term
t(x) of arity (σ; τ) such that (∀xσ)ϕ(t(x), x) holds.
Proposition 1 implies that MSO(M) proves the following equations:
πi(〈t1, . . . , tn〉) .=σi ti and t .=σ1×···×σn 〈π1(t), . . . , πn(t)〉 (3)
Hence each formula ϕ(aσ11 , . . . , a
σn
n ) can be seen as a formula ϕ(a
σ1×···×σn).
Eager Functions. A causal function Σ →S Γ is eager if it can produce a prefix
of length n+1 of its output from a prefix of length n of its input. More precisely,
an eager F : Σ →S Γ is induced by a map f : Σ∗ → Γ as
F (B)(n) = f(B(0) · . . . · B(n − 1)) (for all B ∈ Σω and all n ∈ N)
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Finite-state eager functions are those induced by eager (Moore) machines (see
also [11]). An eager machine E : Σ → Γ is a Mealy machine Σ → Γ whose output
function λ : QE → Γ is does not depend on the current input letter. An eager
E : Σ → Γ induces an eager function via the map (a ∈ Σ∗) 
→ (λE(∂∗E(a)) ∈ Γ ).
We write F : Σ →E Γ when F : Σ →S Γ is eager and F : Σ →EM Γ when F
is f.s. eager. All functions F : Σ →M 1, and more generally, constants functions
F : Σ →S Γ are eager. Note also that if F : Σ →S Γ is eager, then F : Σ →EM Γ .
On the other hand, if F : Σ →EM Γ is induced by an eager machine E then F is
finite-state causal as being induced by the Mealy machine with same states and
transitions as E , but with output function (q, a) 
→ λE(q).
Eager functions do not form a category since the identity of S is not eager.
On the other hand, eager functions are closed under composition with causal
functions.
Proposition 2. If F is eager and G,H are causal then H ◦ F ◦ G is eager.
Isolating eager functions allows a proper treatment of strategies in games and
realizers w.r.t. the Dialectica interpretation. Since Σ+ → Γ  Σ∗ → ΓΣ , maps
Σ →E ΓΣ are in bijection with maps Σ →S Γ . This easily extends to machines.
Given a Mealy machine M : Σ → Γ , let Λ(M) : Σ → ΓΣ be the eager machine
defined as M but with output map taking q ∈ QM to (a 
→ λM(q, a)) ∈ ΓΣ .
Example 2. Recall the Mealy machine M : 2 → 2 of Ex. 1.(c). Then Λ(M) :
2 → 22 is the eager machine displayed in Fig. 1 (right, where the output is
indicated within states).
Eager f.s. functions will often be used with the following notations. First, let
@ be the pointwise lift to M of the usual application function ΓΣ × Σ → Γ . We
often write (F )G for @(F,G). Consider a Mealy machine M : Σ → Γ and the
induced eager machine Λ(M) : Σ → ΓΣ . We have
FM(B) = @(FΛ(M)(B), B) (for all B ∈ Σω)
Given F : Γ →E ΣΓ , we write e(F ) for the causal @(F (−),−) : Γ →S Σ. Given
F : Γ →S Σ, we write Λ(F ) for the eager Γ →E ΣΓ such that F = e(Λ(F )).
We extend these notations to terms.
Eager functions admit fixpoints similar to those of contractive maps in the
topos of tree (see e.g. [4, Thm. 2.4]).
Proposition 3. For each F : Σ × Γ →E ΣΓ there is a fix(F ) : Γ →E ΣΓ s.t.
fix(F )(C) = F
(
e(fix(F ))(C) , C) (for all C ∈ Γω)
If F is induced by the eager machine E : Σ ×Γ → ΣΓ , then fix(F ) is induced by
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Games. Traditional solutions to Church’s synthesis turn specifications to infi-
nite two-player games with ω-regular winning conditions. Consider an MSO(M)
formula ϕ(uτ , xσ) with no free variable other than u, x. We see this formula
as defining a two-player infinite game G(ϕ)(uτ , xσ) between the Proponent P
(∃löıse), playing moves in τ and the Opponent O (∀bélard), playing moves in
σ. The Proponent begins, and then the two players alternate, producing an
infinite play of the form
χ := u0x0 · · · unxn · · ·  ((uk)k, (xk)k) ∈ τω × σω
The play χ is winning for P if ϕ((uk)k, (x)k) holds. Otherwise χ is winning for
O. Strategies for P resp. O in this game are functions
σ
∗ −→ τ resp. τ+ −→ σ  τ∗ −→ στ
Hence finite-state strategies are represented by f.s. eager functions. In particular,
a realizer of (∀xσ)(∃uτ )ϕ(u, x) in the sense of Church is a f.s. P-strategy in
G(ϕ((u)x, x))(u(τ)σ, xσ)
Most approaches to Church’s synthesis reduce to Büchi-Landweber Theo-
rem [7], stating that games with ω-regular winning conditions are effectively
determined, and that the winner always has a finite-state winning strategy. We
will use Büchi-Landweber Theorem in following form. Note that an O-strategy
in the game G(ϕ)(uτ , xσ) is a P-strategy in the game G(¬ϕ(u, (x)u))(x(σ)τ , uτ).
Theorem 1 ([7]). Let ϕ(uτ , xσ) be an MSO(M)-formula with only u, x free.
Then either there is an eager term u(x) of arity (σ; τ) such that |= (∀x)ϕ(u(x), x)
or there is an eager term x(u) of arity (τ ; (σ)τ) such that |= (∀u)¬ϕ(u, e(x)(u)).
It is decidable which case holds and the terms are computable from ϕ.
Curry-Howard Approaches. Following the complete axiomatization of MSO
on ω-words of [28] (see also [26]), one can axiomatize MSO(M) with a deduction
system based on arithmetic (see Sect. 4.1). Consider an instance of Church’s










for an eager term u(x) or a causal term x(u). By enumerating proofs and
machines, one thus gets a (naive) syntactic algorithm for Church’s synthesis.
But it seems however unlikely to obtain a complete classical system in which the
provable ∀∃-statements do correspond to the realizable instances of Church’s
synthesis, because MSO(M) has true but unrealizable ∀∃-statements. Besides,
note that
(∀xσ)ϕ(e(u)(x), x) MSO(M) (∀xσ)(∃uτ )ϕ(u, x)
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while it is possible both for realizable and unrealizable instances to have





In previous works [25,26], the authors devised intuitionistic and linear vari-
ants of MSO on ω-words in which, thanks to automata-based polarity systems,
proofs of suitably polarized existential statements correspond exactly to realiz-
ers for Church’s synthesis. In particular, [26] proposed a system LMSO based
on (intuitionistic) linear logic [13], such that via a translation (−)L : MSO →
LMSO, provable ∀∃(−)L-statements exactly correspond to realizable instances






)]L or LMSO (∀u(τ)σ)(∃xσ)
[¬ϕ((u)x, x)]L (6)
This paper goes further. We show that the automata-based realizability
model of [26] can be obtained in a syntactic way, thanks to a (linear) Dialectica-
like interpretation of a variant of LMSO, which turns a formula ϕ to a formula
ϕD of the form (∃u)(∀x)ϕD(u, x), where ϕD(u, x) essentially represents a deter-
ministic automaton. While the correctness of the extraction procedure of [25,26]
relied on automata-theoretic techniques, we show here that it can be performed
syntactically. Second, by extending LMSO with realizable axioms, we obtain a
system LMSO(C) in which, using an adaptation of the usual Characterization
Theorem for Dialectica stating that (see e.g. [16]), alternatives of the
form (6) imply that for a closed ϕ,
LMSO(C) ϕ or LMSO(C) ϕ  ⊥
where (−)  ⊥ is a linear negation. We thus get a complete linear system with
extraction of suitably polarized ∀∃-statements. Such a system can of course not
have a standard semantics, and indeed, LMSO(C) has a functional choice axiom
(∀xσ)(∃yτ )ϕ(x, y) − (∃f (τ)σ)(∀xσ)ϕ(x, (f)x) (LAC)
which is realizable in the sense of both (−)D and [26], but whose translation to
MSO(M) (which precludes (5)) is false in the standard model.
3 A Monadic Linear Dialectica-Like Interpretation
Gödel’s “Dialectica” functional interpretation associates to ϕ(a) a formula ϕD(a)
of the form (∃uτ )(∀xσ)ϕD(u, x, a). In usual versions formulated in higher-types
arithmetic (see e.g. [1,16]), the formula ϕD is quantifier-free, so that ϕD is a
prenex form of ϕ. This prenex form is constructive, and a constructive proof of
ϕ can be turned to a proof of ϕD with an explicit (closed) witness for ∃u. We call
such witnesses realizers of ϕ. Even if Dialectica originally interprets intuitionistic
arithmetic, it is structurally linear: in general, realizers of contraction
ϕ(a) −→ ϕ(a) ∧ ϕ(a)
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ϕ  ϕ
ϕ  γ, ϕ′ ψ, γ  ψ′
ϕ, ψ  ϕ′, ψ′
ϕ, ϕ, ψ, ψ  ϕ′
ϕ, ψ, ϕ, ψ  ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ′, ϕ, ψ, ψ′
ϕ  ϕ′, ψ, ϕ, ψ′
ϕ  ψ
ϕ, I  ψ  I
ϕ, ϕ0, ϕ1  ϕ′
ϕ, ϕ0 ⊗ ϕ1  ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ, ϕ′ ψ  ψ, ψ′
ϕ, ψ  ϕ ⊗ ψ, ϕ′, ψ′
ϕ, ϕ  ψ
ϕ  ϕ  ψ
⊥ 
ϕ  ψ
ϕ  ⊥, ψ
ϕ, ϕ  ϕ′ ψ, ψ  ψ′
ϕ, ψ, ϕ ψ  ϕ′, ψ′
ϕ  ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ0 ϕ1, ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ, ϕ′ ψ, ψ  ψ′
ϕ, ψ, ϕ  ψ  ϕ′, ψ′
ϕ, ϕ  ϕ′
ϕ, (∃zτ )ϕ  ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ[tτ/xτ ], ϕ′
ϕ  (∃xτ )ϕ, ϕ′
ϕ, ϕ[tτ/xτ ]  ϕ′
ϕ, (∀xτ )ϕ  ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ
ϕ  (∀zτ )ϕ
Fig. 2. Deduction for MF (where zτ is fresh).
only exist when the term language can decide ϕD(u, x, a), which is possible in
arithmetic but not in all settings. Besides, linear versions of Dialectica were
formulated at the very beginning of linear logic [21–23] (see also [14,27]).
In this paper, we use a variant of Dialectica as a syntactic formulation of the
automata-based realizability model of [26]. The formula ϕD essentially repre-
sents a deterministic automaton on ω-words and is in general not quantifier-free.
Moreover, we extract f.s. causal functions, while the category M is not closed.
As a result, a realizer of ϕ is an open (eager) term u(x) of arity (σ; τ) satisfying
ϕD(u(x), x). While it is possible to exhibit realizers for contraction on closed
ϕ thanks to the Büchi-Landweber Theorem, this is generally not the case for
open ϕ(a). We therefore resort to working in a linear system, in which we obtain
witnesses for ∀∃(−)L-statements (and thus for realizable instances of Church’s
synthesis), but not for all ∀∃-statements.
Fix a set of atomic formulae At containing all (tτ .= uτ ), and a standard
interpretation extending Sect. 2 for each α ∈ At.
3.1 The Multiplicative Fragment
Our linear system is based on full intuitionistic linear logic (see [15]). The for-
mulae of the multiplicative fragment MF are given by the grammar:
(where α ∈ At). Deduction is given by the rules of Fig. 2 and the axioms
 tτ .= tτ tτ .= uτ , ϕ[tτ/xτ ]  ϕ[uτ/xτ ]
tτ  = uτ 
 tτ .= uτ (7)
Each formula ϕ of MF can be mapped to a classical formula ϕ (where I, ,
⊗, are replaced resp. by ,→,∧,∨). Hence ϕ holds whenever  ϕ
The Dialectica interpretation of MF is the usual one rewritten with the con-
nectives of MF, but for the disjunction that we treat similarly as ⊗. To each
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(ϕ ⊗ ψ)D(a) := ∃〈u, v〉∀〈x, y〉. (ϕ ⊗ ψ)D(〈u, v〉, 〈x, y〉, a) :=
∃〈u, v〉∀〈x, y〉. ϕD(u, x, a) ⊗ ψD(v, y, a)
(ϕ ψ)D(a) := ∃〈u, v〉∀〈x, y〉. (ϕ ψ)D(〈u, v〉, 〈x, y〉, a) :=
∃〈u, v〉∀〈x, y〉. ϕD(u, x, a) ψD(v, y, a)
(ϕ  ψ)D(a) := ∃〈f, F 〉∀〈u, y〉. (ϕ  ψ)D(〈f, F 〉, 〈u, y〉, a) :=
∃〈f, F 〉∀〈u, y〉. ϕD(u, (F )uy, a)  ψD((f)u, y, a)
(∃w.ϕ)D(a) := ∃〈u, w〉∀x. (∃w.ϕ)D(〈u, w〉, x, a) := ∃〈u, w〉∀x. ϕD(u, x, 〈a, w〉)
(∀w.ϕ)D(a) := ∃f ∀〈x, w〉. (∀w.ϕ)D(f, 〈x, w〉, a) := ∃f ∀〈x, w〉. ϕD((f)w, x, 〈a, w〉)
Fig. 3. The Dialectica Interpretation of MF (where types are leaved implicit).
formula ϕ(a) with only a free, we associate a formula ϕD(a) with only a free,
as well as a formula ϕD with possibly other free variables. For atomic formulae
we let ϕD(a) := ϕD(a) := ϕ(a). The inductive cases are given on Fig. 3, where
ϕD(a) = (∃u)(∀x)ϕD(u, x, a) and ψD(a) = (∃v)(∀y)ψD(v, y, a).
Dialectica is such that ϕD is equivalent to ϕ via possibly non-intuitionistic
but constructive principles. The tricky connectives are implication and uni-
versal quantification. Similarly as in the intuitionistic case (see e.g. [1,16,33]),
(ϕ  ψ)D is prenex a form of ϕD  ψD obtained using (LAC) together with
linear variants of the Markov and Independence of premises principles. In our
case, the equivalence also requires additional axioms for ⊗ and . We
give details for the full system in Sect. 3.3.
The soundness of (−)D goes as usual, excepted that we extract open eager
terms: from a proof of ϕ(aκ) we extract a realizer of (∀a)ϕ(a), that is an open
eager term u(x, a) s.t.  ϕD(@(u(x, a), a), x, a). Composition of realizers (in part.
required for the cut rule) is given by the fixpoints of Proposition 3. Note that a
realizer of a closed ϕ is a finite-state winning P-strategy in G(ϕD)(u, x).
3.2 Polarized Exponentials
It is well-known that the structure of Dialectica is linear, as it makes problematic
the interpretation of contraction:
In our case, the Büchi-Landweber Theorem implies that all closed instances of
contraction have realizers which are correct in the standard model. But this is
in general not true for open instances.
Example 3. Realizers of ϕ  ϕ ⊗ ϕ for a closed ϕ are given by eager terms
U1(u, x1, x2), U2(u, x1, x2), X(u, x1, x2) which must represent P-strategies in the
game G(Φ)(〈U1, U2,X〉, 〈u, x1, x2〉), where Φ is
ϕD(u, (X)ux1x2) −→ ϕD((U1)u, x1) ∧ ϕD((U2)u, x2)
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By the Büchi-Landweber Theorem 1, either there is an eager term U(x) such
that ϕD(U(x), x) holds, so that
ϕD(u, x1) −→ ϕD(e(U)(x1), x1) ∧ ϕD(e(U)(x2), x2)
or there is an eager term X(u) such that ¬ϕD(u, e(X)(u)) holds, so that
ϕD(u, e(X)(u)) −→ ϕD(u, x1) ∧ ϕD(u, x2)
Example 4. Consider the open formula ϕ(ao) := (∀xo)(t(x, a) .= 0ω) where
t(B,C) = 0n+11ω for the first n ∈ N with C(n+1) = B(0) if such n exists, and
such that t(B,C) = 0ω otherwise. The game induced by ((∀a)(ϕ  ϕ ⊗ ϕ))D
is G(Φ)(X, 〈x1, x1, a〉), where Φ is
t((X)x1x2a, a)
.= 0ω −→ t(x1, a) .= 0ω ∧ t(x2, a) .= 0ω
In this game, P begins by playing a function 23 → 2, O replies in 23, and then
P and O keep on alternatively playing moves of the expected type. A finite-state
winning strategy for O is easy to find. Let P begin with the function X. Fix some
a ∈ 2 and let i := X(0, 1, a). O replies (0, 1, a) to X. The further moves of P
are irrelevant, and O keeps on playing (−,−, 1 − i) (the values of x1 and x2 are
irrelevant after the first round). This strategy ensures
t((X)x1x2a, a)
.= 0ω ∧ ¬(t(x1, a) .= 0ω ∧ t(x2, a) .= 0ω)
Hence we can not realize contraction while remaining correct w.r.t. the
standard model. On the other hand, Dialectica induces polarities generaliz-
ing the usual polarities of linear logic (see e.g. [17]). Say that ϕ(a) is posi-
tive (resp. negative) if ϕD(a) is of the form ϕD(a) = (∃uτ )ϕD(u,−, a) (resp.
ϕD(a) = (∀xσ)ϕD(−, x, a)). Quantifier-free formulae are thus both positive and
negative.
Example 5. Polarized contraction
gives realizers of all instances of itself. Indeed, with say ϕD(a) = (∃u)ϕD(u,−, a)
and ψD(a) = (∀y)ψD(−, y, a), Λ(π1) (for π1 a M-projection on suitable types)
gives eager terms U(u, a) and Y(y, a) such that
We only have exponentials for polarized formulae. First, following the usual
polarities of linear logic, we can let
(!(ϕ+))D(a) := (∃u)(!(ϕ+))D(u,−, a) := (∃u)!ϕD(u,−, a)
(?(ψ−))D(a) := (∀y)(?(ψ−))D(−, y, a) := (∀x)?ψD(−, y, a)
(8)
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ψ  ψ′
ψ, !ϕ  ψ′
ψ, !ϕ, !ϕ  ψ′
ψ, !ϕ  ψ′
ϕ, ϕ  ϕ′
ϕ, !ϕ  ϕ′
!ϕ  ϕ, ?ψ
!ϕ  !ϕ, ?ψ
ϕ, !ϕ  ψ, ?ψ
ϕ  !ϕ  ψ, ?ψ
ψ  ψ′
ψ  ?ϕ, ψ′
ψ  ?ϕ, ?ϕ, ψ′
ψ  ?ϕ, ψ′
ϕ  ϕ, ψ
ϕ  ?ϕ, ψ
!ϕ, ϕ  ?ψ
!ϕ, ?ϕ  ?ψ
ϕ  ϕ, ?ψ
ϕ  (∀z)ϕ, ?ψ
Fig. 4. Exponential rules of PF.
Hence !ϕ is positive for a positive ϕ and ?ψ is negative for a negative ψ. The
following exponential contraction axioms are then interpreted by themselves:
Second, we can have exponentials !(ψ−) and ?(ϕ+) with the automata-based
reading of [26]. Positive formulae are seen as non-deterministic automata, and
?(−) on positive formulae is determinization on ω-words (McNaughton’s Theo-
rem [19]). Negative formulae are seen as universal automata, and !(−) on negative
formulae is co-determinization (an instance of the Simulation Theorem [10,20]).
Formulae which are both positive and negative (notation (−)±) correspond to
deterministic automata, and are called deterministic. We let
(!(ψ−))D(a) := (!(ψ−))D(−,−, a) := !(∀x)ψD(−, x, a)
(?(ϕ+))D(a) := (?(ϕ+))D(−,−, a) := ?(∃u)ϕD(u,−, a)
(9)
So !(ψ−) and ?(ϕ+) are always deterministic. The corresponding exponential
contraction axioms are interpreted by themselves. This leads to the following
polarized fragment PF (the deduction rules for exponentials are given on Fig. 4):
3.3 The Full System
The formulae of the full system FS are given by the following grammar:
Deduction in FS is given by Figs. 2, 4 and (7). We extend − to FS with !ϕ :=
?ϕ := ϕ. Hence ϕ holds when  ϕ is derivable. The Dialectica interpreta-
tion of FS is given by Fig. 3 and (8), (9) (still taking ϕD(a) := ϕD(a) := ϕ(a)
for atoms). Note that (−)D preserves and reflects polarities.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). Let ϕ be closed with ϕD = (∃uτ )(∀xσ)ϕD(u, x).
From a proof of ϕ in FS one can extract an eager term u(x) such that FS proves
(∀xσ)ϕD(u(x), x).
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As usual, proving requires extra axioms. Besides (LAC), we use the
following (linear) semi-intuitionistic principles (LSIP), with polarities as shown:
as well as the following deterministic exponential axioms (DEXP):
δ − !δ and ?δ − δ (δ deterministic)
All these axioms but (LAC) are true in the standard model (via −). Moreover:
Proposition 4. The axioms (LAC) and (LSIP) are realized in FS. The axioms
(DEXP) are realized in FS + (DEXP).
Theorem 3 (Characterization). We have
Corollary 1 (Extraction). Consider a closed formula ϕ := (∀xσ)(∃uτ )δ(u, x)
with δ deterministic. From a proof of ϕ in FS + (LAC) + (LSIP) + (DEXP) one
can extract a term t(x) such that |= (∀xσ)δ(t(x), x).
Note that FS + (DEXP) proves for all deterministic δ.
3.4 Translations of Classical Logic
There are many translations from classical to linear logic. Two canonical possi-
bilities are the (−)T and (−)Q-translation of [9] (see also [17,18]) targeting resp.
negative and positive formulae. Both take classical sequents to linear sequents
of the form !(−)  ?(−), which are provable in FS thanks to the PF rules
ϕ, !ϕ  ψ, ?ψ
ϕ !ϕ  ψ, ?ψ
ϕ  ϕ, ?ψ
ϕ  (∀z)ϕ, ?ψ
For the completeness of LMSO(C) (Theorem 6, Sect. 4), we shall actually require
a translation (−)L such that the linear equivalences (with polarities as displayed)
are provable possibly with extra axioms that we require to realize themselves. In
part., (10) implies (DEXP), and (−)L should give deterministic formulae. While
(−)T and (−)Q can be adapted accordingly, (10) induces axioms which make the
resulting translations equivalent to the deterministic (−)L-translation of [26]:
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Proposition 5. The scheme (10) is equivalent in FS to (DEXP)+(PEXP), where
(PEXP) are the following polarized exponential axioms, with polarities as shown:
Proposition 6. If ϕ is provable in many-sorted classical logic with equality then
FS + (DEXP) proves ϕL.
Proposition 7. The axioms (PEXP) are realized in FS + (LSIP) + (DEXP) +
(PEXP). Corollary 1 thus extends to FS + (LAC) + (LSIP) + (DEXP) + (PEXP).
Note that ϕL is deterministic and that ϕL = ϕ.
4 Completeness
In Sect. 3 we devised a Dialectica-like (−)D providing a syntactic extraction pro-
cedure for ∀∃(−)L-statements. In this Section, building on an axiomatic treat-
ment of MSO(M), we show that LMSO, an arithmetic extension of FS+(LSIP)+
(DEXP)+(PEXP) adapted from [26], is correct and complete w.r.t. Church’s syn-
thesis, in the sense that the provable ∀∃(−)L-statements are exactly the realiz-
able ones. We then turn to the main result of this paper, namely the completeness
of LMSO(C) := LMSO + (LAC). We fix the set of atomic formulae
α ∈ At ::= tτ .= uτ | to ⊆̇ uo | E(to) | N(to) | S(to, uo) | 0(to) | to ≤̇ uo
4.1 The Logic MSO(M)
MSO(M) is many-sorted first-order logic with atomic formulae α ∈ At. Its sorts
and terms are those given in Sect. 2, and standard interpretation extends that
of Sect. 2 as follows: ⊆̇ is set inclusion, E holds on B iff B is empty, N (resp. 0)
holds on B iff B is a singleton {n} (resp. the singleton {0}), and S(B,C) (resp.
B ≤̇ C) holds iff B = {n} and C = {n + 1} for some n ∈ N (resp. B = {n}
and C = {m} for some n ≤ m). We write xι for variables xo relativized to N, so
that (∃xι)ϕ and (∀xι)ϕ stand resp. for (∃xo)(N(x) ∧ ϕ) and (∀xo)(N(x) → ϕ).
Moreover, xι ∈̇ t stands for xι ⊆̇ t, so that to ⊆̇ uo is equivalent to (∀xι)(x ∈̇
t → x ∈̇ u).
The logic MSO+ [26] is MSO(M) restricted to the type o, hence with only
terms for Mealy machines of sort (2, . . . ,2;2). The MSO of [26] is the purely
relational (term-free) restriction of MSO+. Recall from [26, Prop. 2.6], that for
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E(t)  t ⊆̇ u
ϕ  t ⊆̇ z, ϕ′
ϕ  E(t), ϕ′
ϕ, z ⊆̇ t  E(z), z .= t, ϕ′
ϕ  N(t),E(t), ϕ′
ϕ,N(z), z ⊆̇ t  z ⊆̇ u, ϕ′
ϕ  t ⊆̇ u, ϕ′ N(t),E(t) 
 t ⊆̇ t t ⊆̇ u, u ⊆̇ v  t ⊆̇ v t ⊆̇ u, u ⊆̇ t  t .= u N(t), u ⊆̇ t  E(u), u .= t S(t, u), 0(u) 
N(t)  t ≤̇ t t ≤̇ u, u ≤̇ v  t ≤̇ v t ≤̇ u, u ≤̇ t  t .= u S(t, u)  t ≤̇ u 0(t)  N(t)
ϕ, 0(z)  ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ′ S(u, v), t ≤̇ v  t .= v, t ≤̇ u t ≤̇ u  N(t) t ≤̇ u  N(u) S(t, u)  N(t)
ϕ, S(t, z)  ϕ′
ϕ  ϕ′ 0(t), 0(u)  t .= u S(t, u), S(t, v)  u .= v S(u, t), S(v, t)  u .= v S(t, u)  N(u)
Fig. 5. The Arithmetic Rules of MSO(M) and LMSO (with terms of sort o and z fresh).
each Mealy machine M : 2p → 2, there is an MSO-formula δM(X,x) such that
for all n ∈ N and all B ∈ (2ω)p, we have FM(B)(n) = 1 iff δM({n}, B) holds.
The axioms of MSO(M) are the arithmetic rules of Fig. 5, the axioms (7) and
the following, where M : 2p → 2 and y, z,X are fresh.
 (∀Xo)(∀xι) (x ∈̇ fM(X) ↔ δM(x,X)
)  (∃Xo)(∀xι) (x ∈̇ X ↔ ϕ)
ϕ, 0(z)  ϕ[z/x], ϕ′ ϕ,S(y, z), ϕ[y/x]  ϕ[z/x], ϕ′
ϕ  (∀xι)ϕ,ϕ′
The theory MSO(M) is complete. Thus provability in MSO(M) and validity
in the standard model coincide. This extends [26, Thm. 2.11 (via [28])].
Theorem 4 (Completeness of MSO(M)). For closed MSO(M)-formulae ϕ,
we have |= ϕ if and only if MSO(M) ϕ.
4.2 The Logic LMSO
The system LMSO is FS+ (LSIP) + (DEXP) + (PEXP) extended with Fig. 5 and
Let LMSO(C) := LMSO + (LAC). Note that MSO(M) ϕ whenever LMSO ϕ.
Proposition 6 extends so that similarly as in [26] we have
Proposition 8. If MSO(M) ϕ then LMSO ϕL. In part., for a realizable instance
of Church’s synthesis (∀xσ)(∃uτ )ϕ(u, x), we have LMSO (∀xσ)(∃uτ )ϕL(u, x).
Moreover, the soundness of (−)D extends to LMSO. It follows that LMSO(C) is
coherent and proves exactly the realizable ∀∃(−)L-statements.
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Theorem 5 (Soundness). Let ϕ be closed with ϕD = (∃uτ )(∀xσ)ϕD(u, x).
From a proof of ϕ in LMSO(C) one can extract an eager term u(x) such that
LMSO proves (∀xσ)ϕD(u(x), x).
Corollary 2 (Extraction). Consider a closed formula ϕ := (∀xσ)(∃uτ )
δ(u, x) with δ deterministic. From a proof of ϕ in LMSO(C) one can extract
a term t(x) such that |= (∀xσ)δ(t(x), x).
4.3 Completeness of LMSO(C)
The completeness of LMSO(C) follows from a couple of important facts. First,
LMSO(C) proves the elimination of linear double negation, using (via Theorem3)
the same trick as in [26].
Lemma 1. For all LMSO-formula ϕ, we have (ϕ  ⊥)  ⊥ LMSO(C) ϕ.
Combining Lemma 1 with (LAC) gives classical linear choice.
Corollary 3. (∀f)(∃x)ϕ(x, (f)x) LMSO(C) (∃x)(∀y)ϕ(x, y).
The key to the completeness of LMSO(C) is the following quantifier inversion.
Lemma 2. (∀xσ)ϕ(tτ (x), x) LMSO(C) (∃uτ )(∀xσ)ϕ(u, x), where t(x) is eager.
Lemma 2 follows (via Corollary 3) from the fixpoints on eager machines (Proposi-
tion 3). Fix an eager tτ (xσ). Taking the fixpoint of (f)t(x) : σ× (σ)τ →EM
σ(σ)τ gives a term vσ(f (σ)τ ) such that v(f) .= @(f, t(v(f))). Then conclude
with
















LMSO(C) (∃uτ )(∀xσ)ϕ(u, x)
Completeness of LMSO(C) then follows via (−)D, Proposition 5, completeness of
MSO(M) and Büchi-Landweber Theorem 1. The idea is to lift a f.s. winning
P-strat. in G(ϕD(u, x))(u, x) to a realizer of ϕD = (∃u)(∀x)ϕD(u, x) in
LMSO(C).
Theorem 6 (Completeness of LMSO(C)). For each closed formula ϕ, either
LMSO(C) ϕ or LMSO(C) ϕ  ⊥.
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5 Conclusion
We provided a linear Dialectica-like interpretation of LMSO(C), a linear vari-
ant of MSO on ω-words based on [26]. Our interpretation is correct and com-
plete w.r.t. Church’s synthesis, in the sense that it proves exactly the realiz-
able ∀∃(−)L-statements. We thus obtain a syntactic extraction procedure with
correctness proof internalized in LMSO(C). The system LMSO(C) is moreover
complete in the sense that for every closed formula ϕ, it proves either ϕ or its
linear negation. While completeness for a linear logic necessarily collapse some
linear structure, the corresponding axioms (DEXP) and (PEXP) do respect the
structural constraints allowing for realizer extraction from proofs. The complete-
ness of LMSO(C) contrasts with that of the classical system MSO(M), since the
latter has provable unrealizable ∀∃-statements. In particular, proof search in
LMSO(C) for ∀∃(−)L-formulae and their negation is correct and complete w.r.t.
Church’s synthesis. The design of the Dialectica interpretation also clarified the
linear structure of LMSO, as it allowed us to decompose it starting from a system
based on usual full intuitionistic linear logic (see e.g. [3] for recent references on
the subject).
An outcome of witness extraction for LMSO(C) is the realization of a simple
version of the fan rule (in the usual sense of e.g. [16]). We plan to investigate
monotone variants of Dialectica for our setting. Thanks to the compactness
of Σω, we expect this to allow extraction of uniform bounds, possibly with
translations to stronger constructive logics than LMSO.
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